The Representative Democracy Data Archive (REPDEM) - Basic dataset

This comparative dataset builds on previous datasets (Andersson et al 2020, Bergman et al 2019, Bergman et al 2021, Bergman et al 2024, Hellström et al 2021, Strøm et al 2008), and has been updated in-house to cover additional years, additional countries (vetted by county experts), and additional variables. The dataset provides detailed information on important aspects of government formation and government termination in 33 parliamentary democracies from 1945 (or their democratic transitions) up to mid-2025.

How to cite

When using these data, please cite the following:

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Structure of the codebook

The following sections then each contain detailed information on

- the name of the variable as it is defined in the dataset,
- the label briefly describing the variable,
- the attached value label,
- relevant additional information on specific coding decisions (where applicable).

For several variables, such as the partisan composition of the cabinet, the information is given using party abbreviations and/or party IDs. Please refer to the corresponding Party codebook for further information. For additional information on coding and definitions of most variables, please see Notes on Coding Principles.

References

Andersson, Staffan, Torbjörn Bergman, Svante Ersson, and Johan Hellström (2020). "The European Representative Democracy Data Archive, Release 4 (Final release)". Main sponsor: Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (In2007-0149:1-E).

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Strøm, Kaare, Müller, Wolfgang C. and Bergman, Torbjörn, eds. (2008). *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

General information on the cabinets

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
country_id	Country		
country_id_iso	Country numeric ISO code		ISO 3166-1 standard
country_name	Country name		Country name in English
cab_id	Cabinet ID	First two digits: country Last three digits: cabinet	
old_cab_id	Cabinet ID, old standard	First two digits: country Second two digits: cabinet	
unique_id	Unique ID for the cabinet ID and government composition	256-bit hex value	Unique ID based on a SHA256 hash of a concatenated string of cab_id, ., and potential_government. E.g., if cab_id is 1001, and potential_government is 10001,10004,10005, the concatenated string is 1001.10001,10004,10005
old_unique_id	Unique ID for old cabinet ID and government composition	256-bit hex value	Unique ID based on a SHA256 hash of a concatenated string of old_cab_id, ., and potential_government. E.g., if old_cab_id is 101, and potential_government is 10001,10004,10005, the concatenated string is 1001.10001,10004,10005
cab_name	Cabinet		Name of the PM consecutively numbered with Roman numerals
date_in	Date in	YYYY-MM-DD (e.g., 2014-07-13)	The first day in cabinet life, according to official criteria, is defined as: (a) The date that the PM/cabinet was appointed by the head of state (b) Date of investiture vote in parliament (c) Date of the general election
year_month_in	Year/month of cabinet formation	YYYYMM (e.g. 201407)	
year_in	Year of cabinet formation	YYYY	
date_out	Date out	YYYY-MM-DD (e.g., 2014-07-13)	Last day in cabinet life is defined as: (a) Day of cabinet resignation (b) Day of the general election

year_month_out	Year/month of cabinet termination	YYYYMM (e.g. 201407)	
year_out	Year of cabinet termination	YYYY	
date_in_str	Date in string	YYYY-MM-DD (e.g., 2014-07-13)	
date_out_str	Date out string	YYYY-MM-DD (e.g., 2014-07-13)	
form_decade	Decade by date of formation	*For example:* 90: 1990s 100: 2000s 110: 2010s 120: 2020s	
cab_duration_max	Maximum possible cabinet duration	measured in days	Defined as: Remainder of the parliamentary term, when the cabinet assumes office until (a) Next constitutionally mandated parliamentary elections (b) The next constitutionally mandated presidential elections if it is required or customary for governments to resign at that time
cab_duration_days	Cabinet duration	measured in days	Defined as: time period between cabinet's first and last day in office
cab_duration_relative	Relative cabinet duration	measured as a proportion (0–1)	Defined as: share of potential duration the cabinet was in office
cab_duration_full	Full duration technical termination	0: no 1: yes	Takes the value 1 if the cabinet terminates due to technical reasons and its relative duration is greater than 90%.
cab_composition1	Cabinet composition	Party abbreviations; see party codebook	List of cabinet parties, beginning with the party of the PM
cab_composition2	Cabinet composition	Party IDs; see party codebook	List of cabinet parties, beginning with the party of the PM
cab_party**X**	Cabinet party **X**	Party-IDs; see party codebook	**X** corresponds to the party with the same last digits, e.g. seats_party14 for country 12 corresponds to the party with the party id 120014
cab_num_parties	Number of cabinet parties		Number of cabinet parties excluding independents.

cab_coalition	Coalition	0: no 1: yes	A government coalition is defined as a multi-party government where more than one party is represented in the cabinet. This includes all types of coalition governments, including minority coalitions, minimal winning coalitions (MWCs), and surplus/oversized majority cabinets.
cab_majority	Cabinet majority (50% + 1) seat)	0: no 1: yes	The cabinet holds 50% plus one seat in parliament. This includes all types of majority governments, including Single party majority cabinet; minimal winning coalitions; and surplus/oversized majority cabinets.
cab_sp_majority	Single-party majority cabinet	0: no 1: yes	A single-party majority cabinet holds 50% plus one seat in parliament and is not a coalition.
cab_minority	Minority cabinet	0: no 1: yes	A minority cabinet holds less than 50 % plus one seat in parliament. This includes all types of minority governments, including single party minority cabinets and minority coalition.
cab_sp_minority	Single-party minority cabinet	0: no 1: yes	A single-party minority cabinet holds less than 50% plus one seat in parliament (and is not a coalition).
cab_coal_minority	Minority coalition	0: no 1: yes	A minority coalition hold less than 50 % plus one seat in parliament.
cab_sub_minority	Substantial minority cabinet	0: no 1: yes	A substantial minority cabinet is a minority cabinet that does not reach majority status with seats added from formal support parties.
cab_mwc	Minimal winning coalition	0: no 1: yes	A minimal-winning coalition (MWC) is one that needs all its members for a parliamentary majority.
cab_formal_minority	Formal minority cabinet	0: no 1: yes	A formal minority cabinet has majority support in parliament (only) when including the seats of formal support parties
cab_surplus	Surplus majority cabinet	0: no 1: yes	Surplus majority coalitions or oversized coalitions have more parties than is needed for a parliamentary majority (i.e., they can lose a coalition party and still have a majority of parliamentary seats).
cab_caretaker	Caretaker cabinet	0: no 1: yes	A caretaker cabinet refers to a non-partisan cabinet, e.g., appointed by a president to hold an election.

govtype	Government type	1: Min 2: Maj 3: Mwc 4: Sur 5: Non	Minority cabinet: Holds less than 50 % plus one seat in parliament. Single-party minority cabinets are likewise coded as 'Min' Single-party majority cabinet: Holds 50% plus one seat in parliament. Is not a coalition. Minimal winning coalition: Is turned into a losing coalition by the subtraction of any of the coalition parties, i.e., if it loses a coalition party it holds less than 50 % plus one seat. Surplus majority coalition: Can lose a coalition party and still be winning, i.e., control 50 % plus one seat or more in the parliament. A non-partisan cabinet, e.g., appointed by a president to hold an election
newgov_type	Type of new government	1: Election 2: Replacement 3: PM change, but same party composition as previous cabinet 4: Other 5: Non-partisan cabinet	Records if a new cabinet results from an election, replacement of one or several cabinet parties without a preceding election, or if there has only been a change of PM without a preceding election.
post_election_cab	Post-electoral cabinet	0: No 1: Yes	A post-electoral cabinet is a cabinet formed after (and as a result of) a parliamentary election.
support_parties	Support parties	See party codebooks.	Only includes formal support parties, i.e., those that have a formal written agreement with the government guaranteeing, at minimum, support in issues of confidence and supply.
support_party**X**	Support party **X**	See party codebooks.	The party ID for support party X.
techno_maj	Technocrat ministry majority	0: No 1: Yes	Indicates whether a majority of cabinet ministers are technocrats (1) or whether a majority of cabinet ministers are party representatives (0).
techno_pm	Technocrat PM	0: No 1: Yes	Indicates whether the PM is a technocrat or not.
techno_remit	Broad policy remit	0: No 1: Yes	A cabinet without a broad policy remit is considered a caretaker cabinet.

The political parties and the party system (lower chamber)

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
prox_election	Proximity to election: lower chamber	1 (FE): Cabinets formed immediately following an election and ended by the next election. 2 (F): Cabinets formed immediately following an election. 3 (N): Cabinets neither formed immediately following an election nor ended by the next election. 4 (E): Cabinets ended by an election.	Information on when a cabinet was formed and terminated in relation to parliamentary elections (lower chamber). Please note that the 'proximity to election' is undecided for the last cabinet in each country if it has not terminated.
elecdate	Election date	YYYY-MM-DD (e.g. 2014-07-13)	Date of most recent parliamentary election: (a) Two-round elections: date of the second round (b) Elections held over several days: date of last day
country_elec_num	Sequential election number in the country		Starts at 1 for the first election recorded in the data. Does not always correspond to the country's first free and open multiparty election if these were held before the end of World War II.
country_elec_id	Election ID	First two digits: country ID Second two digits: election number	A sequential number recording the sequence of elections in a country, beginning with the election preceding the first cabinet in the data. E.g., the first election in country 1 has the election ID 101.
num_parties	Number of parties in parliament		All political parties, excluding 'others'.
largest_party1	Largest party in parliament, 1st	See party codebooks.	Largest party in terms of seats.
largest_party2	Largest party in parliament, 2nd	See party codebooks.	The largest party in terms of seats if two parties have equal size.
largest_party_incab	The largest party in parliament is in the cabinet	0: No 1: Yes	If the largest party in parliament (lower chamber) is in government. If there are two parties with the largest number of seats in parliament, the inclusion of either party is counted as the largest party being a member of the government.
largest_party_share	Seat share of the largest party in parliament: lower chamber	measured as a proportion (0–1)	Seat share of the largest party in parliament (lower chamber).

largest_party_bp	Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) of the largest party in parliament: lower chamber		Bargaining power (the normalized Banzhaf index) of the largest party in parliament (lower chamber). The normalised, or relative, index assigns voting power shares to each parliamentary party and captures the numerical importance of political parties in forming majority coalitions. For instance, a majority party that controls 50 % plus one seat or more in the parliament will always get a Banzhaf score of one, as it will always be needed to form a majority.
minority_sit	Minority situation in parliament	0: no 1: yes	No single party holds 50% plus one seat or more of the parliamentary seats.
seats_total	Total number of seats: lower chamber		The total number of seats in parliament (lower chamber).
cab_strength_lower	Cabinet strength: lower chamber		Total number of seats of all cabinet parties.
cab_strength_lower_supported	Cabinet strength including formal support parties: lower chamber		Total number of seats of all cabinet parties plus the seats of any formal support parties.
cab_strength_out	Cabinet strength at date out: lower chamber		Total number of seats of all cabinet parties on the last day of a government's tenure.
cab_seatshare	Cabinet seat share: lower chamber		The total seat share of all cabinet parties.
cab_seatshare_supported	Cabinet seat share including formal support parties		The seat share in the lower chamber of all cabinet parties, including any formal support parties.
cab_connected	Ideologically connected cabinet	0: no 1: yes	In a "connected cabinet," the parties are "next to one another" along an economic left-right placement of political parties.
cab_mwcc	Minimal Winning Connected Cabinet	0: no 1: yes	A cabinet is a MWCC if (i) it is connected, and (ii) it cannot remain winning AND connected by dropping a party.
cab_mwccs	MWCC including single-party cabinets	0: no 1: yes	Minimal Winning Connected Cabinet, including single-party majority governments.
cab_prefrange	Cabinet preference range, RILE		The cabinet preference range is the distance between the left-most and right-most parties in the cabinet. Based on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale
cab_prefrange_logit	Cabinet preference range, RILE, logit scaled		The cabinet preference range is the distance between the left-most and right-most parties in the cabinet. Based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale.

cab_prefrange_prosser	Cabinet preference range, Prosser (2014) left-right scale		The cabinet preference range is the distance between the left-most and right-most parties in the cabinet. Based on Manifesto Project's data, but using the categories suggested by Prosser (2014) for constructing the left-right scale.
cab_prefrange_prosser_logit	Cabinet preference range, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled		The cabinet preference range is the distance between the left-most and right-most parties in the cabinet. Based on Manifesto Project's data, but using the categories suggested by Prosser (2014) for constructing the left-right scale, and the data have been logit-scaled (see Lowe et al. 2011
cab_prefrange_ches	Cabinet preference range, CHES general left-right scale (lrgen)		The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in the cabinet based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey's general left-right scale (lrgen).
cab_polar	Cabinet polarization, RILE		Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in the cabinet, based on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale
cab_polar_logit	Cabinet polarization, RILE, logit scaled		Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in the cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale
cab_polar_prosser	Cabinet polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale		Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in the cabinet, based on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension
cab_polar_prosser_logit	Cabinet polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled		Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in the cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension
cab_polar_ches	Cabinet polarization, CHES general left-right scale (lrgen)		Measured as the standard deviation from the mean position in the cabinet, based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey's general left-right scale (lrgen).
cab_wpolar	Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in the cabinet, based on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale
cab_wpolar_logit	Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD, logit scaled		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in the cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale
cab_wpolar_prosser	Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in the cabinet, based on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension

cab_wpolar_prosser_logit	Cabinet polarization, RILE, weighted SD, logit scaled		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in the cabinet, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension
cab_wpolar_ches	Cabinet polarization, CHES general left-right scale (lrgen)		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in the cabinet, based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey's general left-right scale (lrgen).
cab_gravity	Cabinet centre of gravity, RILE		The Centre of gravity is a measure of a government's mean ideological position (by calculating the cabinet's ideological centre of gravity as the weighted mean position of the parties in the cabinet). The Manifesto Project's left-right (RILE) scale has been used to estimate party positions.
cab_gravity_logit	Cabinet centre of gravity, RILE, logit scaled		The Centre of gravity is a measure of a government's mean ideological position (by calculating the cabinet's ideological centre of gravity as the weighted mean position of the parties in the cabinet). The logit scaled version (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's left-right (RILE) scale has been used to estimate party positions.
cab_gravity_prosser	Cabinet centre of gravity, Prosser (2014) left-right scale		The Centre of gravity is a measure of a government's mean ideological position (by calculating the cabinet's ideological centre of gravity as the weighted mean position of the parties in the cabinet). The Manifesto Project categories suggested by Prosser (2014) for a general left-right scale have been used to estimate party positions.
cab_gravity_prosser_logit	Cabinet centre of gravity, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled		The Centre of gravity is a measure of a government's mean ideological position (by calculating the cabinet's ideological centre of gravity as the weighted mean position of the parties in the cabinet). The logit scaled version (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project categories suggested by Prosser (2014) for a general left-right scale has been used to estimate party positions.
cab_gravity_ches_lrgen	Cabinet centre of gravity, CHES general left-right scale (lrgen)		The Centre of gravity is a measure of a government's mean ideological position (by calculating the cabinet's ideological centre of gravity as the weighted mean position of the parties in the cabinet). The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys general left-right (lrgen) scale has been used to estimate party positions.
cab_enpp	Effective number of cabinet parties: lower chamber		The 'effective number of cabinet parties' is a measure of cabinet fractionalization.
enpp	Effective number of parliamentary parties: lower chamber		The effective number of parliamentary parties in the lower chamber. All legislators subsumed under 'others' are treated as one single party. The effective number of parties is a measure of parliamentary fractionalization.

enpp_no_others	Effective number of parliamentary parties: lower chamber (Other minor parties and independents excluded)		The effective number of parliamentary parties in the lower chamber, excluding some minor parties and independents (i.e., all legislators subsumed under 'others' have been excluded from the measure's calculation). The effective number of parties is a measure of parliamentary fractionalization
bp_fract	Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) fractionalization: lower chamber		A measure of parliamentary fractionalization that uses the same calculation as for the effective number of parties, but using bargaining power (the banzhaf index) values instead of party seat shares as weights.
soc_share	Seat share of socialist parties: lower chamber		Seat share of socialist parties includes parties that are coded as belonging to the socialist or other left parties (20) or social democratic parties (30) party families in the Manifesto Project data.
soc_green_share	Seat share of socialist and green parties: lower chamber		Seat share of socialist and green parties includes parties that are coded as belonging to the ecologist/green parties (10), socialist or other left parties (20), or social democratic parties (30) party families in the Manifesto Project data.
con_share	Seat share of conservative parties: lower chamber		Seat share of conservative parties includes parties that are coded as belonging to the liberal (40) or conservative (60) party families in the Manifesto Project data.
con_alt_share	Seat share of conservative parties: lower chamber, alternative operationalization		Seat share of conservative parties includes parties that are coded as belonging to the Christian democratic (50) or conservative (60) party families in the Manifesto Project data.
rad_share	Seat share of radical left/right parties: lower chamber		Seat share of radical left/right parties includes parties that are coded as belonging to the socialist or other left parties (20) or nationalist and radical right parties (70) party families in the Manifesto Project data.
parl_prefrange	Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, RILE		The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in parliament on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale.
parl_prefrange_logit	Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, RILE, logit scaled		The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in parliament on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale using logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011).
parl_prefrange_prosser	Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, Prosser (2014) scale		The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in parliament on the general-left right dimension in the Manifesto Project data based on the categories suggested by Prosser (2014).
parl_prefrange_prosser_logit	Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, Prosser (2014) scale, logit scaled		The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in parliament on the general-left right dimension in the Manifesto Project data based on the categories suggested by Prosser (2014) using logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011).

parl_prefrange_ches	Parliamentary preference range: lower chamber, CHES general left-right scale (lrgen)		The distance between the left-most and right-most parties in parliament on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey's general left-right scale (lrgen).
parl_polar_rile	Parliamentary polarization, RILE		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in parliament, based on the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale
parl_polar_rile_logit	Parliamentary polarization, RILE, logit scaled		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in parliament, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) of the Manifesto Project's Right-Left (RILE) scale
parl_polar_prosser	Parliamentary polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in parliament, based on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension
parl_polar_prosser_logit	Parliamentary polarization, Prosser (2014) left-right scale, logit scaled		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in parliament, based on the logit scaling (Lowe et al. 2011) on Prosser's (2014) suggested categories in the Manifesto Project data for the general left-right dimension
parl_polar_ches	Parliamentary polarization, CHES general left-right scale (lrgen)		Measured as the standard deviation from the weighted (by seats) mean position in parliament, based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey's general left-right scale (lrgen).
dim_first_median	Party of the median legislator: first policy dimension; lower chamber	Party-IDs; see party codebooks	The party of the median legislator on the first policy dimension of conflict, excluding parties subsumed under the 'other' category.
dim_first_median_2nd	Party of the median legislator: first policy dimension; lower chamber; 2nd party	Party-IDs; see party codebooks	The party of the median legislator on the first policy dimension of conflict, excluding parties subsumed under the 'other' category. Only recorded if there is a tie between two parties (i.e., when there are two median legislators).
dim_first_median_bp	Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) of the party of the median legislator: first policy dimension; lower chamber		Bargaining power (the normalized Banzhaf index) of the party of the median legislator of the first policy dimension. The normalised, or relative, index assigns voting power shares to each parliamentary party and captures the numerical importance of political parties in forming majority coalitions. For instance, a majority party that controls 50 % plus one seat or more in the parliament will always get a Banzhaf score of one, as it will always be needed to form a majority government.
dim_first_median_2nd_bp	Bargaining power (Banzhaf index) of the party of the median legislator: first policy dimension; lower chamber; 2nd party		Bargaining power (the normalized Banzhaf index) of the party of the median legislator of the second policy dimension. The normalised, or relative, index assigns voting power shares to each parliamentary party and captures the numerical importance of political parties in forming majority coalitions. For instance, a majority party that controls 50 %

			plus one seat or more in the parliament will always get a Banzhaf score of one, as it will always be needed to form a majority government.
dim_first_label	First policy dimension (label)		A descriptive label of the first policy dimension of conflict.
dim_second_median	Party of the median legislator: second policy dimension; lower chamber	Party-IDs; see party codebooks	The party of the median legislator on the second policy dimension of conflict, excluding parties subsumed under the 'other' category.
dim_second_median_2nd	Party of the median legislator: second policy dimension; lower chamber; 2nd party	Party-IDs; see party codebooks	The party of the median legislator on the second policy dimension of conflict, excluding parties subsumed under the 'other' category. Only recorded if there is a tie between two parties (i.e., when there are two median legislators).
dim_second_label	Second policy dimension (label)		A descriptive label of the second policy dimension of conflict.
dim_third_median	Party of the median legislator: third policy dimension; lower chamber	Party-IDs; see party codebooks	The party of the median legislator on the third policy dimension of conflict, excluding parties subsumed under the 'other' category.
dim_third_label	Third policy dimension (label)		A descriptive label of the third policy dimension of conflict.
median_party_economic_1st	Party of the median legislator on the economic left-right policy dimension		The median legislator party on the economic left-right policy dimension
median_party_economic_2nd	Party of the median legislator on the economic left-right policy dimension		The second median legislator party on the economic left-right policy dimension, if there is a tie between two parties (i.e., when there are two median legislators).

The political parties and the party system (upper chamber)

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
prox_election_upper	Proximity to election: upper chamber	1 (FE): Cabinets immediately following an election and ending by the next election. 2 (F): Cabinets immediately following an election. 3 (N): Cabinets neither immediately following an election nor ended by the next election. 4 (E): Cabinets ended by an election.	Information on when a cabinet was formed and terminated in relation to parliamentary elections (upper chamber).
upper_seats_total	Total number of seats: upper chamber		The total number of seats in parliament (upper chamber).
cab_strength_upper	Cabinet strength: upper chamber		Total number of seats of all cabinet parties (upper chamber).
cab_strength_upper_out	Cabinet strength at date out: upper chamber		Total number of seats of all cabinet parties at the last day of a government's tenure (upper chamber).
upper_majority	Cabinet majority (50% + 1) seat: upper chamber	0: no 1: yes	The government has a parliamentary majority in the upper chamber.
upper_enpp	Effective number of parliamentary parties: upper chamber		All legislators subsumed under 'others' are treated as one single party (minimum fragmentation)
upper_dim_first_median	Party of the median legislator: first policy dimension; upper chamber	Party-IDs; see party codebooks	The party of the median legislator on the first policy dimension of conflict in the upper chamber, excluding parties subsumed under the 'other' category.
upper_dim_second_median	Party of the median legislator: second policy dimension; upper chamber	Party-IDs; see party codebooks	The party of the median legislator on the second policy dimension of conflict in the upper chamber, excluding parties subsumed under the 'other' category.

Bargaining over government

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
form_duration	Number of days required for cabinet formation	measured in days	Time period between ‘Date out’ of the previous cabinet and ‘Date in’ of the current cabinet.
form_duration_alt	Number of days required for cabinet formation	measured in days	Number of days since the election, OR the ‘Date out’ of the previous cabinet if it is terminated between elections. Thus, this alternative measurement ignores/does not count the time between ‘Date out’ of the previous cabinet and the election date.
form_invest_pro	Final vote of investiture: pro		Number of votes in favour (pro) in the final investiture vote.
form_invest_con	Final vote of investiture: contra		Number of votes against (contra) in the final investiture vote.
form_invest_abs	Final vote of investiture: abstentions		Number of abstentions in the final investiture vote.

Ministries/ministers

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
num_ministries	Number of ministries		Number of ministries of the incumbent government.
num_ministers	Number of cabinet members		Number of cabinet members/ministers of the incumbent government.

Termination events

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
term_disc	Discretionary termination	0: no 1:yes	Events of cabinet termination for political reasons. Discretionary termination can be strategically timed early elections, parliamentary defeat, or when a cabinet ends because a cabinet member leaves or a new one joins the coalition, or because of policy or personnel conflicts between coalition parties (these two are not mutually exclusive)
term_tech_regelec	Regular parliamentary election	0: no 1: yes	Termination due to a regularly scheduled election.

term_tech_const	Other constitutional reason	0: no 1: yes	Termination due to various constitutional reasons (except regular elections), e.g., a new constitution.
term_tech_death	Death of PM	0: no 1: yes	Termination due to the death of the PM.
term_disc_earlyelec	Early parliamentary election	0: no 1: yes	A termination due to an early parliamentary election. As many countries lack fixed election dates, we do not count reductions by less than 10 % of the maximum legislative term as early elections in these countries.
term_disc_enlarge	Voluntary enlargement of coalition	0: no 1: yes	New coalition partners join the cabinet.
term_disc_voluntary	Other voluntary reason	0: no 1: yes	These are all instances that do not fall into any of the existing discretionary termination categories, such as the PM's voluntary resignation.
term_disc_cabdefeat	Cabinet defeat in parliament	0: no 1: yes	Cabinet defeat in parliament refers to when a cabinet resigns due to a non-confidence or confidence vote.
term_disc_conflict_pol	Conflict between coalition parties (policy)	0: no 1: yes	Policy conflicts emerge from disputes over policies between coalition parties.
term_disc_conflict_pers	Conflict between coalition parties (personnel)	0: no 1: yes	Personnel conflicts emerge from the election or appointment of officeholders.
term_disc_conflict	Conflict between coalition parties (policy and/or personnel)	0: no 1: yes	Terminations due to policy and/or personnel conflicts.
term_disc_conflict_parties	Conflict between coalition parties: Parties involved	Party IDs; see party codebooks	

term_disc_intra	Intra party conflict	0: no 1: yes	Termination due to conflict within a single party or within several parties in the cabinet.
term_disc_intra_party	Intra party conflict: Party involved	Party IDs; see party codebooks	
term_disc_intra_conflict	Intra party conflict: Type of conflict	L – Conflict in national party leadership (national executive committee, cabinet, parliamentary party leadership) (NB: This is conflict contained in the leadership.) NL – Conflict between united national party leadership (national executive committee, cabinet, parliamentary party leadership) and non-leaders (party activists, party congress delegates, backbench MPs, regional leaders, etc.) LNL – Conflict in national party leadership (national executive committee, cabinet, parliamentary party leadership), including grass-roots mobilization (i.e., conflict is not confined to the top level)	Indicates the type of intra-party conflict for cabinets that terminated due to internal conflicts within one or several parties.
term_event_nonparlelec	Non-parliamentary elections	0: no 1: yes	Non-parliamentary elections (presidential, regional) that cause government resignation for political reasons.
term_event_popshock	Popular opinion shock	0: no 1: yes	Resignation because the cabinet has lost public support or resignation because the government wants to hold an early election to benefit from a boost in the polls.
term_event_intnat	International or national security event	0: no 1: yes	International or security event, e.g., the outbreak of war or a terrorist attack.
term_event_econ	Economic event	0: no 1: yes	Termination due to an economic event, e.g., a major bank's breakdown or a currency crash.

term_event_pers	Personal event	0: no 1: yes	Indicates termination due to various personal events, e.g., a sex scandal, a corruption scandal, etc.
term_ministry	Ministry involved		Indicates which ministries are involved in the conflict(s) that result in cabinet termination.
term_descr	Description of termination		A brief description of why a cabinet terminated.

Institutions

Variable	**Label**	**Value Label/Format**	**Additional Information**
inst_bicam	Bicameralism	0: no 1: yes	Bicameral systems where the upper chamber must at least have a temporary suspensive veto.
inst_posparl	Positive parliamentarism	0: no 1: yes	A new PM/cabinet comes to power only if it wins a majority vote (positive investiture) in the parliament.
inst_convote	Constructive vote of no-confidence	0: no 1: yes	Parliament is only allowed to withdraw confidence from a PM/cabinet if there is an absolute majority for a chosen successor as PM.
inst_pmpower	PM powers		Ranges theoretically from 0 to 7, with an increasing number indicating an increasingly more powerful PM. Additive index of seven indicators that together form a simple additive index. The indicators concern the PMs (1) appointment and (2) dismissal powers vis-à-vis the individual ministers, (3) agenda power over cabinet meetings, (4) steering and coordination prerogatives, (5) parliamentary accountability of ministers only via the PM (and not directly), and (6) direct PM control over setting the jurisdiction of ministers. Finally (7), whether the PM has an administrative unit that can monitor and scrutinize individual ministries.
pmpower_formcab	Formal cabinet decision rule	0: no 1: yes	Is there a formal decision rule in the cabinet?

pmpower_formcab_rule1	Type of actual decision rule 1	1: unanimity 2: majority 3: consensus defined by PM (by way of summarizing cabinet debate) 4: consensus defined by the head of state (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)	Which type of decision rule (formal or informal) is used in cabinet decision-making?
pmpower_formcab_rule2	Type of actual decision rule 2	1: unanimity 2: majority 3: consensus defined by PM (by way of summarizing cabinet debate) 4: consensus defined by the head of state (by way of summarizing cabinet debate)	Which type of decision rule (formal or informal) is used in cabinet decision-making?
pmpower_minappoint	PM right to appoint ministers	0: no 1: yes	Does the PM have the right to appoint ministers?
pmpower_minappoint_rule	Type of actual appointment right	1: yes, PM alone 2: yes, through a formal act carried out by the head of state 3: no, the head of state has discretionary powers 4: other	Does the PM have the right to appoint ministers, and under which rules?
pmpower_mindismiss	PM right to dismiss ministers	0: no 1: yes	Does the PM have the right to dismiss ministers?
pmpower_mindismiss_rule	Type of actual dismissal right	1: yes, PM alone 2: yes, through a formal act carried out by the head of state 3: no, the head of state has discretionary powers 4: other	Does the PM have the right to dismiss ministers, and under which rules?

pmpower_minaccount	Ministers' parliamentary accountability	0: direct 1: via PM only 2: via vote of no confidence against full cabinet only	Can parliament pass a motion of no-confidence against individual ministers (rather than the PM or the entire cabinet)?
pmpower_pmjurisdiction	PM formal right to determine jurisdiction of ministries	0: no 1: yes	Does the PM hold the constitutional right to determine the number of ministries, their tasks and their jurisdictions? The PM does not have this right if a law or parliamentary vote is required for that.
pmpower_pmsteering	PM steering or coordination rights vis-à-vis cabinet ministers	0: no 1: yes	Does the PM have formal (constitutional) steering or coordination rights vis-à-vis cabinet ministers?
pmpower_pmagenda	PM full control over agenda for cabinet meeting	0: no 1: yes	Does the PM have full control over the cabinet agenda?
pmpower_pmoffice	Regular bureaucratic structure in PM's office designed to monitor departmental affairs	0: no 1: yes	Does the PM have resources that provide her/him with independent information/expertise on what goes on in the individual ministries?
pmpower_pmoffice_rule1	Description of structure 1	1: personal staff (political appointees) 2: civil service staff 3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio 4: other	What type of assistance do the PMs have to monitor ministers? (These categories are not mutually exclusive.)
pmpower_pmoffice_rule2	Description of structure 2	1: personal staff (political appointees) 2: civil service staff 3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio 4: other	What type of assistance do the PMs have to monitor ministers? (These categories are not mutually exclusive.)
pmpower_pmoffice_rule3	Description of structure 3	1: personal staff (political appointees) 2: civil service staff 3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio 4: other	What type of assistance do the PMs have to monitor ministers? (These categories are not mutually exclusive.)

pmpower_pmoffice_rule4	Description of structure 4	1: personal staff (political appointees) 2: civil service staff 3: PM occupies specific (PM) portfolio 4: other	What type of assistance do the PMs have to monitor ministers? (These categories are not mutually exclusive.)
inst_seminpres	Semi-presidentialism	0: no 1: yes	Semi-presidential systems are defined as political systems (1) with a popularly elected head of state (2), who directly influences cabinet formation and/or termination.
inst_comment	Comments on institutional features		

Investiture vote rules

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
invest_exist	Existence of investiture vote	0: no 1: yes	Is there a de facto investiture vote before or after a new PM/cabinet comes to power?
invest_rounds_max	Allowed number of investiture votes/rounds		What is the maximum number of votes/rounds for investiture votes (if any)?
invest_rule1	Decision rule for first investiture vote/round	1: Majority support (50%+1 votes) 2: Plurality support 3: Plurality support among different options 4: No majority against 5: No investiture vote	Which kind of vote/decision rule is used for the first round of voting?
invest_rule2	Decision rule for second investiture vote/round	1: Majority support (50%+1 votes) 2: Plurality support 3: Plurality support among different options 4: No majority against 5: No investiture vote	Which kind of vote/decision rule is used for the second round of voting?

invest_rule3	Decision rule for third investiture vote/round	1: Majority support (50%+1 votes) 2: Plurality support 3: Plurality support among different options 4: No majority against 5: No investiture vote	Which kind of vote/decision rule is used for the third round of voting?
invest_rule4	Decision rule for forth investiture vote/round	1: Majority support (50%+1 votes) 2: Plurality support 3: Plurality support among different options 4: No majority against 5: No investiture vote	Which kind of vote/decision rule is used for the fourth round of voting?
invest_object	Object of investiture vote	1: Only PM 2: Whole cabinet 3: Single ministers 4: Government and its programme	Lists all objects that need to pass an investiture vote, separated by commas.
invest_object1	Object of investiture vote: first object	1: Only PM 2: Whole cabinet 3: Single ministers 4: Government and its programme	Which elements of the cabinet and/or its policy programme are subject to the investiture vote?
invest_object2	Object of investiture vote: second object	1: Only PM 2: Whole cabinet 3: Single ministers 4: Government and its programme	Which elements of the cabinet and/or its policy programme are subject to the investiture vote?
invest_inoffice	Government in office after investiture object	1: Only PM 2: Whole cabinet 3: Single ministers 4: Government and its programme	In the case of multiple objects of investiture, it indicates after which object the government can effectively act (e.g., has control over armed forces)

invest_timing	Timing of investiture vote	1: Before taking office 2: After taking office 3: Both before and after taking office	When must the investiture votes take place in relation to the government taking office?
invest_bicameral	Approval required for investiture vote in bicameral systems	1: Only in first/lower chamber 2: In both chambers	Is approval required in both chambers, or only in the lower chamber? (In unicameral systems, this is coded as 1).
invest_comment	Comments on investiture vote		

Presidential powers

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
pres_pop	Popularly elected president	0: no 1: yes	Is the president elected by popular vote?
pres_appoint_pm	Presidential power to appoint PM	0: No appointment power 1: Free choice 2: Constitution gives open room for interpretation 3: Constitution gives clear instruction	Does the president have the power to appoint the prime minister, and under which restrictions?
pres_appoint_restr	Restrictions on presidential power to appoint PM		Clarification on what constitutional restrictions apply if a president has limited appointment power.
pres_select_pm	Presidential power to select the PM	0: No power or only formal powers 1: Selecting power	Does the president have the power to appoint the prime minister, and under which restrictions?
pres_dismiss	Presidential power to dismiss PM/cabinet at own initiative	0: No dissolution at own initiative 1: Free choice (at own initiative) 2: In case of parliamentary (in)activity	Does the president have the power to dismiss the PM/cabinet, and if so, when?
pres_dissolve_parl	Presidential power to dissolve parliament	0: No dissolution at own initiative 1: Free choice (at own initiative) 2: In case of parliamentary (in)activity	Does the president have the power to dissolve parliament, and if so, when?
pres_veto	Presidential veto powers	0: No veto power 1: Veto can be overruled by supermajority 2: Veto can be overruled by majority of the new parliament after new elections 3: Veto can be overruled by absolute majority 4: Veto can be overruled by simple majority	To what extent does the president have veto powers?

		5: The Veto of the president leads to a referendum	
pres_veto_expl	Presidential veto powers: explanation		Provides further detail on any veto powers held by the president, if any
pres_decree	Presidential decree powers	0: No decree power 1: Decree power 2: Decrees need to be countersigned by the PM	Does the president have the power to issue decrees?
pres_decree_expl	Presidential decree powers: explanation		Provides further detail on any decree powers held by the president, if any
pres_init	Presidential right of initiative (legislation)	0: No (The President cannot initiate legislation) 1: Yes (The President can initiate legislation)	Does the president have the right to initiate legislation?
pres_refer	Presidential power of referenda	0: No right to initiate referenda 1: Right to initiate referenda 2: Right to initiate referenda in assent with parliament/government 3: Right to initiate referenda on the initiative of the people 4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues	Does the president have the right to initiate referenda? All relevant referenda powers are listed and separated by commas.
pres_refer_rule1	Presidential power of referenda: first right	0: No right to initiate referenda 1: Right to initiate referenda 2: Right to initiate referenda in accordance with parliament/government 3: Right to initiate referenda on the initiative of the people 4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues	

pres_refer_rule2	Presidential power of referenda: second right	0: No right to initiate referenda 1: Right to initiate referenda 2: Right to initiate referenda in accordance with parliament/government 3: Right to initiate referenda on the initiative of the people 4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues	
pres_refer_rule3	Presidential power of referenda: third right	0: No right to initiate referenda 1: Right to initiate referenda 2: Right to initiate referenda in accordance with parliament/government 3: Right to initiate referenda on the initiative of the people 4: Right to initiate referenda on special issues	
pres_comment	Comments on presidential powers		

External indices

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
vdem_elecdem	V-Dem: Electoral democracy index		V-Dem's electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy) from the year the cabinet took office. Ranges from 0 (low) to 1 (high).
vdem_libdem	V-Dem: Libreal democracy index		V-Dem's liberal democracy index (v2x_libdem) from the year the cabinet took office. Ranges from 0 (low) to 1 (high).
vdem_partipdem	V-Dem: Electoral democracy index		V-Dem's participatory democracy index (v2x_partipdem) from the year the cabinet took office. Ranges from 0 (low) to 1 (high).

vdem_delibdem	V-Dem: Deliberative democracy index		V-Dem's deliberative democracy index (v2x_delibdem) from the year the cabinet took office. Ranges from 0 (low) to 1 (high).
vdem_egaldem	V-Dem: Egalitarian democracy index		V-Dem's egalitarian democracy index (v2x_egaldem), ranging from 0 (low) to 1 (high).

Please see https://www.v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/ for suggested citations for the V-Dem indices.

Seat data

Variable	Label	Value Label/Format	Additional Information
seats_party**X**	Party seats lower chamber: Party **X**		**X** corresponds to the party with the same last digits, e.g. seats_party14 for country 12 corresponds to the party with the party id 120014
upper_seats_party**X**	Party seats upper chamber: Party **X**		**X** corresponds to the party with the same last digits, e.g. upper_seats_party14 for country 12 corresponds to the party with the party id 120014